Foundations and fault lines: the legal framework relating to freedom of speech and freedom of religion or belief in Sri Lanka

Freedom of Expression (FoE) and Freedom of Religion or Belief (FoRB) are sometimes viewed as competing rights: we are frequently told that to protect the sanctity of faith, we must muzzle the speaker—and to protect the speaker, we must disregard the believer. However, the National Christian Evangelical Alliance of Sri Lanka’s (NCEASL) recently launched report titled, “Navigating Intersecting Rights: Freedom of Religion or Belief and Freedom of Expression in Sri Lanka”, suggests this is a false dichotomy – and that far from being in conflict, FORB and FoE are “mutually reinforcing” and “inextricably linked”. The report shows that there is an inherent connection between a person’s internal thoughts and the way they express them to the world. When we protect the right to speak, we protect the right to manifest faith; when we censor speech, we inevitably undermine the freedom of belief itself. Drawing on legal analysis, expert interviews and case studies, the report documents the lived experiences of Sri Lankans navigating this intersection. The article summarises its findings on the legal framework.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) establish FoRB and FoE as interdependent and mutually reinforcing. International human rights standards emphasize that human rights protect people rather than belief systems; therefore, the ability to express or critique religious ideas is essential to the full exercise of religious freedom itself. While Sri Lanka has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), significant gaps remain between international standards and domestic legislation – with the intersection of these freedoms often characterized by tension, institutional bias, and the restrictive application of law. A key obstacle is the failure to translate international treaty obligations into domestic law. As a “dualist” state, Sri Lanka requires specific legislative enactment to render its international obligations domestically enforceable. The failure to achieve this coherent translation of international obligations has resulted in a legal vacuum where constitutional and legal provisions frequently fall short of international standards. Article 10 of the Constitution protects the internal freedom of thought – which is absolute and cannot be subject to any limitations – while the manifestation of religion protected under Article 14(1)(e) is subject to restrictions – although in Sri Lanka, these limitations are broader than those recognized by the ICCPR. Specifically, the Sri Lankan framework permits restrictions based on “general welfare,” exceeding permitted limitations based on necessity and proportionality as allowed under the ICCPR.

Sri Lanka has several legislative enactments that, while ostensibly meant to maintain harmony, have been persistently utilized to stifle dissent:

The ICCPR Act No. 56 of 2007: Intended to criminalize the advocacy of religious hatred that constitutes incitement to violence (Article 20 of the ICCPR), Section 3 of the Act has instead been used as a tool for repression and transformed into a pseudo-blasphemy law – frequently invoked to punish those perceived as wounding majoritarian religious sentiments rather than protecting vulnerable groups from actual incitement. Speaking at the online launch of the report, Dr. Gehan Gunatilleke explained that Section 3 of the Act is inherently vague and poorly drafted, as it largely reproduces the text of Article 20 of the ICCPR without being carefully formulated as a criminal offence – failing to clearly define the elements of the crime or establish the evidentiary threshold required for prosecution, resulting in rendering the provision difficult to enforce. The ICCPR Act also omits the international three-part test (legality, necessity, and proportionality) and the high threshold for determining if an expression constitutes incitement, as set out in the UN Rabat Plan of Action. (e.g. the arrests of comedian Nathasha Edirisooriya and Pastor Jerome Fernando – in both cases, the state invoked Section 3 of the ICCPR Act not to prevent actual incitement to violence, but to appease the majority in a context where Article 9 gives Buddhism a special status).
The Penal Code (Sections 291A/291B): These provisions criminalize the ‘deliberate and malicious’ wounding of religious feelings through words and actions. In practice, however, they have been applied to shield majoritarian religious sentiments from legitimate critique, with blasphemy-type restrictions effectively criminalizing dissent that does not reach the internationally recognised threshold of incitement. (e.g. arrest of Nathasha Edirisooriya)
Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA): The PTA contains overbroad language and continues to be used as a blunt instrument for “over-securitized” governance. Section 2(1)(h) allows for the detention of individuals for speech that causes “religious disharmony,” or “ill-will” without requiring a link to actual violence. This ambiguity allows the state to target dissenters, as seen in the detention of individuals for peaceful religious convictions (e.g. Mohammed Rusdi).
The Online Safety Act (OSA) 2024: This Act introduces vague provisions, with Sections 15 and 16 penalizing ‘false statements’ that outrage religious feelings, containing penalties significantly harsher than the Penal Code for similar offences. Because theological claims are by nature non-empirical and lie beyond logical testing, the power to define a theological statement as ‘false’ grants the state-appointed Online Safety Commission an arbitrary and subjective authority to regulate faith-based discourse and threatens self-censorship and ultimately creates a chilling effect on dissenters and legitimate criticism. The Act also lacks a clear appeal process for removed content and expands state access to user data, creating a profound risk to anonymity and theological discourse. Thus, the OSA essentially empowers the state to mandate a ‘truth’ for religious dogma, creating a significant threat to FoRB.

A further concern raised at the report’s launch by Nathasha Edirisooriya, who has direct personal experience of these provisions, is that the density of technical and legal language renders these laws largely inaccessible to ordinary citizens – limiting not only public understanding, but the very possibility of public scrutiny.

The report also draws attention to the culture of impunity that persists due to entrenched institutional biases. The report’s findings indicate a consistent pattern: law enforcement prioritises majoritarian interests at the direct expense of dissenters and religious minorities. For instance, during communal violence in Aluthgama, Gintota, and Digana, police failed to take effective action against perpetrators from the majority community. This selective application is not incidental: the report argues it amounts to the state functioning as a primary perpetrator of FoRB violations, actively facilitating restrictions on minority expression rather than simply failing to prevent them. The asymmetry is stark – harmful speech targeting minority communities frequently goes uninvestigated, while comparatively minor criticism of the majority religion draws immediate state intervention. These structural legal failures provide the necessary environment for the specific social tensions that are discussed in the report.